Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug Market Violence a Systematic Review

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State of war on Drugs Policing and Constabulary Brutality

War on Drugs policing has failed in its stated goal of reducing domestic street-level drug activity: the toll of drugs on the street remains low and drugs remain widely bachelor.(Baum, 1996; Bertram, Blachman, Sharpe, & Andreas, 1996; Gray, 2010; Tonry, 1994a) Evaluations of specific tactics, such as raids on fissure houses and crackdowns, propose that their effects on drug availability are minimal, decay rapidly, and may readapt drug activeness to other areas and increase drug-related violence.(Benson, Rasmussen, & Sollars, 1995; Sherman, 1990; Sherman et al., 1995; Werb et al., 2011) A big body of inquiry, nonetheless, has identified significant unintended, negative consequences of the War on Drugs' policing strategies for the public's health, including increased take chances of HIV transmission.(Cooper, Moore, Gruskin, & Krieger, 2005; Kerr, Small, & Forest, 2005; Maher & Dixon, 1999) ⁱ This paper seeks to expand this body of work by exploring the interconnections between specific War on Drugs policing strategies and police-related violence confronting Blackness adolescents and adults in the US, a topic that has received little attending thus far.

The Globe Health Arrangement (WHO) classifies police brutality equally a form of violence, and defines violence itself every bit:

"the intentional use of concrete forcefulness or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, some other person, or against a group or customs that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation."

Co-ordinate to WHO, at that place are four types of violence: physical, sexual, psychological, and neglectful.(Krug et al., 2002) While police officers are empowered to apply force, they should use the minimal amount of force needed to "control an incident, upshot an arrest, or protect themselves or others from harm or decease."(The National Institute of Justice, 2012)

This paper provides historical context for considering the connections between race/ethnicity and policing in the The states; reviews erosions to the 4^th Amendment to the US Constitution (which protects against unreasonable search and seizure) and the Posse Comitatus Act (which prohibits the War machine from performing law enforcement functions) that helped set up the groundwork for two vital State of war on Drugs policing strategies: finish and frisk and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams; and describes how stop and frisk and SWAT teams create weather conducive to police brutality, especially brutality that targets Black communities. While many laws and policies have created the foundations for police brutality, I have chosen to focus exclusively on the iv^th Subpoena and the Posse Comitatus Act in order to delve into detail on both, rather than present brief summaries of several policies. Additionally, the rich literature on the intertwined nature of racism, social command, and decisions about which substances should be classified equally "illegal" is beyond the purview of this paper. Readers interested in these topics could review David Musto'due south "The American Disease: The Origins of Narcotic Control" and David Courtwright's "Night Paradise: The History of Opiate Habit in America" to larn more than near this important topic.(Courtwright, 2001; Musto, 2001)

Historical Context for Considering Race/Ethnicity and Policing

In that location are many dissimilar ways to narrate policing's history. One narrative highlights the mutually constitutive nature of policing and race in the United states: this narrative recognizes that policing has been integral to the construction and maintenance of racial hierarchies, and that police force forces themselves were originally established to enforce these hierarchies.(Bass, 2001; Bell, 2000; Brownish, 2005; Eitle & Monohan, 2009; Kelley, 2000; Nunn, 2002; Ritchie & Mogul, 2008) The roots of formal policing in the US lie in slave owners' efforts to control slaves.(Bass, 2001; Bell, 2000; Kelley, 2000; Ritchie & Mogul, 2008; Russell, 2000) Slave patrols were the outset state-sponsored police force forces.(Ritchie & Mogul, 2008) These patrols consisted of White belongings-owning men who were charged with preventing slave uprisings and escapes.(Bass, 2001; Russell, 2000) Slave patrols were particularly vital to maintaining White control in areas where there were more slaves than Whites, and South Carolina, a state where Whites were outnumbered, became the first land to establish them in 1704.(Bass, 2001) Slave patrols had wide authority, and were permitted to enter slaves' homes at will and punish fugitives.(Bass, 2001)

After the Civil War, states replaced slave patrols with police officers who enforced "Black codes;" in 1865, Mississippi and South Carolina became the first states to found these codes.(Bass, 2001; Brown, 2005) Black codes were designed to control Freedmen and Freedwomen by making many activities that had previously been classified equally trivial offenses (and that remained petty offenses when committed past Whites) into serious crimes when committed by Blackness adults and children (e.g., loitering, breaking curfew).(Bass, 2001; Chocolate-brown, 2005) Law generated enough arrests for violating Black Codes that the number of Black inmates in southern prisons skyrocketed;(Adamson, 1983; Johnson, 1995) in Mississippi, for case, the number of Black inmates tripled between 1874 and 1877.(Adamson, 1983)

The federal regime dismantled Blackness Codes during Reconstruction, but later on decades of slave patrols and police enforcement of Black Codes, the mutually constitutive nature of policing and race had been established in the US.(Bass, 2001; Chocolate-brown, 2005; Ritchie & Mogul, 2008) Efforts to maintain racial hierarchies were woven into the fabric of policing strategies, and one dimension of "Black" was living with the persistent and pernicious threat of police intervention, while freedom from this threat helped to define "Whiteness," particularly for flush Whites.(Bass, 2001; Brown, 2005; Ritchie & Mogul, 2008) The persistence of the relationship between policing and race through the 1900s is axiomatic, for example, in police officers' failure to stop lynchings of suspects in their custody, in their active participation in lynchings, and in their enforcement of Jim Crow laws ² .(Bass, 2001; Brown, 2005; Ritchie & Mogul, 2008)

The State of war on Drugs and Expanding Police Powers

Initially declared past President Nixon in 1973,(Lynch, 2012) President Reagan re-dedicated the U.s.a. to the State of war on Drugs in 1982 and escalated it using multiple strategies, including increasing anti-drug enforcement spending, creating a federal drug task strength, and helping to foster a culture that demonized drug use and drug users.(Benson et al., 1995; Nunn, 2002) Between 1982 and 2007, the number of arrests for drug possession tripled, from approximately 500,000 to 1.5 one thousand thousand,(The Bureau of Justice Statistics of The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2008) and drug arrests at present found the largest category of arrests in the US.(Lynch, 2012) Racial/indigenous disparities in drug-related arrests accept too intensified: while in 1976 Blacks constituted 22% of drug-related arrests and Whites constituted 77% of these arrests, past 1992 Blacks accounted for 40% of all drug-related arrests and Whites accounted for 59% of them; throughout these years Blacks comprised about 12% of the full population while Whites were nearly 82%.(Tonry, 1994b) Notably, arrests for all other offenses (excluding assaults, which increased slightly) declined during these years, and racial/ethnic disparities in arrests for these other offenses remained static or declined.(Lynch, 2012)

Police forces and funding increased dramatically to support the War on Drugs. For example, between 1992 and 2008, land and local expenditures on police doubled, from $131/per capita to $260/per capita;(Lynch, 2012) federal expenditures increased as well.(Meeks, 2006) Increased federal, state, and local funding for law enforcement translated into many more officers patrolling the streets. The number of sworn officers in the United states of america increased past 26% betwixt 1992 and 2008.(Bureau of Justice Statistics at the US Department of Justice, 2011) The number of officers patrolling the streets of New York Urban center increased by 47% between 1990 and 1997.(Wynn, 2001) The War on Drugs was also facilitated by increases in the scope of police power and resources. We focus on two of these changes hither: erosions of the 4^th Amendment and of the Posse Comitatus Act.

Erosion of the iv^th Amendment

Part of the Neb of Rights, Amendment Iv asserts that

"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, simply upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and peculiarly describing the identify to exist searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

This Amendment was proposed by the U.s.a. Congress in 1789 in response to the about unlimited power of British customs officers to conduct warrantless searches and seize property without specific authorization in the American colonies.(Saleem, 1997)

In the past few decades, however, the judicial and legislative branches accept eroded "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" by creating what Thurgood Marshall has called "the drug exception to the Constitution."(powell & Hershenov, 1990) In the 1968 Terry v Ohio example, the Supreme Court endorsed a new category of police force intervention in noncombatant life.(Saleem, 1997) Previously, police intervention in noncombatant life had largely been limited to arrests; to arrest a civilian and deprive him or her of freedom, law first had to meet the relatively high standard of probable crusade.(Saleem, 1997) ³ In Terry v Ohio, the Supreme Court decided that officers could end a noncombatant if they reasonably suspected, based on articulable facts, that the noncombatant was currently engaging in criminal action or had engaged in criminal activity.(Saleem, 1997) "Reasonable suspicion" is a lower standard for intervention than "probable cause."(Saleem, 1997) The Supreme Courtroom permitted frisks (i.e., searches of the stopped civilian) if the officer reasonably suspected that the person was armed and unsafe; the frisk was designed to allow the officer to pursue the investigation without fear of violence.(Saleem, 1997) The lower standard for intervention into civilian life (reasonable suspicion vs probable crusade) was permitted in part considering a stop and search was believed to place a far lower burden on the civilian than an arrest.(Saleem, 1997)

In Whren v US (1996) and Illinois v Wardlow (2000), the Supreme Court further lowered the threshold for a police cease.(Barlow & Hickman Barlow, 2002; Nunn, 2002) Whren allowed officers to make "pretext stops," that is, to finish someone for one violation when the officer's true suspicion lay elsewhere (e.k., stop an individual for a modest traffic infraction when the officer's truthful intent was to search the car for drugs).(Barlow & Hickman Barlow, 2002; Nunn, 2002) In Wardlow, the court expanded the legitimate grounds for a stop by ruling that simply running from a police car was suspicious behavior that justified a police cease and search.(Nunn, 2002)

As the thresholds governing when officers could stop and frisk civilians dropped, the cost of these encounters for civilians escalated. Initially stop and frisks were designed to be minimally invasive and brief.(Saleem, 1997) They differed from arrests (and thus has a lower precipitating standard) because a reasonable person would know that he or she could walk abroad from a stop and frisk without damage.(Saleem, 1997) A key component of this stipulation was that stop and frisks did non involve police force, such every bit handcuffs or guns.(Saleem, 1997) In Terry 5 US, for example, Terry was grabbed and his outer garments patted down only the officer did not depict his weapon and did not handcuff Terry until he arrested him.(Saleem, 1997) Over time, even so, a series of court cases have allowed stop and frisks to involve handcuffs, police weapons, and long detentions, thus blurring the lines between a cease and frisk and an arrest.(Saleem, 1997) Contraband (including drugs) constitute during a stop and frisk can be seized.

The Posse Comitatus Act

Passed in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act made it a felony for the Armed services to perform the police enforcement duties of the civilian police.(powell & Hershenov, 1990) The law was passed in the aftermath of the US Ceremonious War to maintain a articulate division between the Armed Forces and domestic police enforcement, and recognized that the Armed Forces and the civilian police had distinct functions: while the Armed services are designed to destroy the enemy, civilian law are charged with protecting civilians and keeping the peace using every bit little force as possible.(Balko, 2006; Nunn, 2002)

The Posse Comitatus Human action has been dismantled over the by 30 years to advance the War on Drugs. The kickoff challenge to the Deed came in 1981, over a century after it was passed, when the military was permitted to give noncombatant police departments access to military machine bases, enquiry, and equipment to strengthen these departments' capacity to wage the State of war on Drugs.(Balko, 2006; powell & Hershenov, 1990) The armed services as well became empowered to train civilian police departments in using armed forces equipment. Five years subsequently, Reagan declared drugs a national security threat; this declaration sanctioned greater collaboration betwixt the armed services and police.(Balko, 2006) In 1993, the ban on the Usa Army's power to train constabulary departments in urban warfare and close-quarters gainsay was lifted.(Balko, 2006; powell & Hershenov, 1990) In 1994, the Department of Defense released a memorandum authorizing the large scale transfer of armed forces equipment and technology to police departments.(Balko, 2006; powell & Hershenov, 1990)

The 4^th Amendment, Posse Comitatus, and Police Brutality

This section traces pathways linking State of war on Drugs policing strategies – and in particular those strategies arising from the erosions of the four^th Amendment and the Posse Comitatus Act – to police brutality by synthesizing findings from several studies. 1 main source of data for this department is a qualitative newspaper that I wrote with several colleagues (Drs. Nancy Krieger, Sofia Gruskin, and Lisa Moore) that described drug injectors' (N=40) and non-drug-users' (N=25) experiences with constabulary-related violence during a constabulary drug crackdown targeting the 46^th precinct of NYC in 2000; at the time of data collection the 46^th precinct was a deeply impoverished community in which more than than 95% of residents were Black or Latino.(Cooper, Moore, Gruskin, & Krieger, 2004) This paper is referred to as "the qualitative paper" below. This discussion is organized around the different types of violence identified by WHO: psychological, physical, sexual, and neglectful violence.(Krug et al., 2002)

Psychological Violence

Stop and frisks proliferated in the U.s.a. during the War on Drugs, especially in impoverished predominately Black and Latino communities. Between 2002 and the 3rd quarter of 2014, 5 meg New Yorkers were stopped and frisked; in any given year during this period betwixt 82% and 90% of people stopped had committed no offense and just 9–12% of people stopped were Not-Hispanic White, though approximately 33% of New Yorkers were non-Hispanic White in 2010.(New York Civil Liberites Union, ND) Cease and frisks tin be highly geographically full-bodied: in a single 8-block area of a predominately Black and Latino neighborhood (home to just 14,000 people), the police conducted 52,000 cease and frisks over a 4-yr flow; 94% of people stopped had committed no offense.(Fabricant, 2011)

Participants in the qualitative report experienced these end and frisks as a course of psychological violence. Relentless cease and frisks "for nothing" or for "no reason" (i.e., that did non consequence in abort) were a chief source of business for participants. According to participants, officers identified hotspots (i.e., spaces where drug action occurred) and viewed anyone walking through that space as a possible criminal, frequently stopping and frisking them; these hotspots might exist a corner, the path of sidewalk outside a bodega, or a stretch of sidewalk in front of an flat house. Simple presence in these hotspots thus seemed to have precipitated "reasonable suspicion" for officers. The participants believed that the officers had usually correctly identified hotspots of drug activity; trouble arose, however, because these hotspots played many other roles in the lives of community residents. A resident might walk through a hotspot to reach the subway or option up a child from school; a hotspot might be directly in front of the archway to a local corner store, a laundromat, or the participant'south apartment building. Officers' tendency to suspect all individuals who passed through hotspots thus led to many stop and frisks of people who were simply going most their daily (legal) lives. For many participants, the relentless end and frisks for "no reason" became a routine and pernicious form of harassment.

Psychological violence also assumed other forms during these stops. During these stops officers might gratuitously insult participants, telling them to move their "black asses" or calling women "bitches." When officers engaged in a sweep (i.e., stopping and searching all individuals who were in a hotspot at a given time) participants described beingness handcuffed and left on the sidewalk for a long fourth dimension while they awaited their plough to exist frisked. As a result of these stop and frisks "for zippo," many participants – specially not-using men and injectors – felt insecure whenever they were in the streets and public spaces of their neighborhood.

Concrete and Sexual Violence

Challenges to The Posse Comitatus Act have led to the rapid growth of SWAT teams in noncombatant police departments. Only a handful of police departments had SWAT teams in the 1960s and 1970s.(Balko, 2006) By 1997, however, 89% of cities with populations >50,000 had at least ane SWAT squad, as did 70% of smaller cities.(Kraska & Cabellis, 1997; Kraska & Kappeler, 1997) SWAT teams are heavily armed with armed forces-grade weapons.(Balko, 2006; Kraska & Kappeler, 1997) Betwixt 1995 and 1997 solitary, for example, the military transferred three,800 M-16s, 2,185 1000-14s, 73 grenade launchers, and 112 tanks to local police departments and trained police officers in how to use this equipment.(Balko, 2006)

The purpose of SWAT teams has evolved over time.(Nunn, 2002) Where they were once reserved to bargain with hostage situations and terrorist attacks, their main purpose at present is to serve warrants for narcotics offenses, oft depression-level drug possession.(Balko, 2006; Nunn, 2002) SWAT teams are deployed approximately 40,000 times a year in the United states of america.(Balko, 2006) These teams typically serve warrants tardily at night, when the target and the rest of his/her family/household are sleeping, and enter the home without warning (i.e., "no-knock warrants").(Balko, 2006) During these nighttime raids, SWAT teams may be heavily armed and use battering rams to enter the dwelling house, diversionary grenades, and other urban warfare tactics.(Balko, 2006; Nunn, 2002) While law departments resist releasing data on SWAT team activities, an assay by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of the approximately 500 drug-related SWAT team events occurring betwixt 2011–2012 for which they had data identified 7 deaths and 46 injuries.(American Civil Liberties Marriage, 2014) Notably, drugs were found in just 35% of SWAT drug raids analyzed by the ACLU, indicating that SWAT teams violently invade the homes of many innocent families.(American Civil Liberties Union, 2014) People living in households targeted by SWAT teams are disproportionately likely to be Blackness or Latino.(American Civil Liberties Union, 2014; Nunn, 2002)

Returning to the findings from the qualitative study, stops and searches could also involve extensive gratuitous concrete and sexual violence. By increasing the frequency of aggressive police/civilian interactions, end and frisks increment the chances that violence will occur. This run a risk may be exacerbated if, consonant with the militarization of police departments, law officers have come up to see civilians less as civilians they are charged to protect and more than as the enemy.(Lynch, 2012; Meeks, 2006; Nunn, 2002) Moreover, when officers regularly treat civilians as enemies, civilians are less probable to comply with their orders, which may in turn further dilate violence.(Hinkle & Weisburd, 2008) Physical violence reported past participants in the qualitative study ranged from gratis kicks to beatings that broke ribs and teeth. Men who injected drugs reported the about extensive and frequent physical violence. Testifying to the questionable apply of police force in these cases, none of the participants who described existence browbeaten was arrested.

Participants in the qualitative study also experienced police-instigated sexual violence. Sexual violence arose in office out of an adaptive dynamic between officers and drug users. In response to the constant threat of a stop and frisk, drug users began storing drugs inside their underwear and inside their bodies, including in their rectums; officers in plow began to search civilians' undergarments and rectums during stop and frisks in their effort to locate drugs. These extensive searches were humiliating for participants, particularly when they happened in public spaces where passersby could witness them.

Neglectful Violence

There are opportunity costs when officers dedicate extensive resource to stop and frisk activity to identify drugs: resources are shifted from other offenses to support these efforts. For example, analyses indicate that rates of holding crimes and Index I violent crimes increase when officer attending and resources are diverted to War on Drugs efforts.(Benson, Leburn, & Rasmussen, 2001; Sollars, Benson, & Rasmussen, 1994)

Data from the qualitative written report besides suggest that civilian-instigated violent crime may receive less attention when officers are concentrating on drug-related offenses. Participants lived in a precinct with a high rate of violent crimes relative to the city as a whole. Participants – both injectors and non-users – reported that officers often did not respond to civilian calls for help when civilians shot each other in public spaces, or that they responded too late to be of assistance. Women who called the police force for help with intimate partner violence believed that the officers ignored their pleas for help. Some other written report has plant that officers appear to believe that some level of violence is normative in impoverished predominately Black or Latino communities, and thus merits less aggressive intervention.(Brunson & Miller, 2006)

Many participants in the qualitative study experienced these different kinds of violence – psychological, physical, sexual, and neglectful – equally forms of racial/ethnic discrimination. Several noted that the officers treated them brutally and ignored their calls for assistance because they lived in a "ghetto" community where their lives simply mattered less.

Conclusions

War on Drugs policing tactics appear to increase police brutality, even as they make little progress in reducing street-level drug activity.(Baum, 1996; Bertram et al., 1996; Cooper et al., 2004; Gray, 2010; Tonry, 1994a; Werb et al., 2011) In the wake of several recent police killings of Black men and boys, social movements are forming again to claiming aggressive law tactics, specially those targeting Black communities.(Santora & Baker, 2014) Several states are also retreating from War on Drugs strategies, including reducing drug crime penalties.(Marcon, 2014) These are promising changes. Ane impactful way to reduce the damage caused past SWAT teams and cease and frisks is to restore the protections that were originally guaranteed by the four^th Amendment and the Posse Comitatus Act. Legal and judicial actions to restore these rights, nevertheless, will take time. In the meantime, police departments can dismantle about of their SWAT teams, and return their remaining SWAT teams to their original purpose: intervening in hostage situations and terrorist attacks rather than in low-level nonviolent drug offenses. At that place is precedent for this: in 1996, for example, a sheriff in Wisconsin disbanded his SWAT teams to protect civilians.(Balko, 2006) Police chiefs can besides directly officers to finish using end and frisks; they discover few real criminals; fray relations between civilians and the police, particularly in poor, predominately Black and Latino communities; and generate considerable police force violence.

Acknowledgments

Support for this work was provided past the grant "Place Characteristics & Disparities in HIV in IDUs: A multilevel analysis of NHBS" (DA035101; Principal Investigator: Cooper). Warmest thanks to Leo Beletsky for his of import insights into an earlier draft of the paper.

Biography

Hannah LF Cooper, ScD. USA. Cooper is an Associate Professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Health Education and in the Department of Epidemiology at Emory Academy'southward Rollins School of Public Wellness. Much of her work is on the structural determinants of wellness, including drug use and HIV.

Footnotes

¹The reader is referred to a useful review about "cause and effect" underpinnings. Hills's criteria for causation were adult in order to help assistance researchers and clinicians determine if hazard factors were causes of a particular affliction or outcomes or merely associated. (Hill, A. B. (1965). The environment and illness: associations or causation? Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 58: 295–300.). Editor's note.

ⁱⁱJim Crow laws in southern states established de jure segregation of Blacks from Whites in public facilities and were instrumental in maintaining White supremacy after the autumn of slavery.

³To run into the probable cause standard, "…the facts and circumstances within the officers' cognition, and of which they take reasonably trustworthy information, [must be] sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a human being of reasonable circumspection that a law-breaking is existence committed." (Brinegar 5. United States, 338 U.Due south. 160, 1949).

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Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4800748/